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INTRODUCTION

Although there is no shortage of case law or commentary on the
covenant of reasonable development implied in oil and gas leases,' its scope
and application may have a renewed significance in the shale gas era. Over the
past decade or so, production companies have entered into new oil and gas
leases with landowners or have acquired older leases long held by production
from shallow or more conventional formations in the Appalachian Basin 2 for
the opportunity to produce natural gas and other hydrocarbons from vast shale
formations like the Marcellus 3 and Utica located predominately in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.4
In these and most oil and gas producing jurisdictions around the
country, courts recognize that, in the absence of express language to the
contrary, there are some circumstances in which a lessee may be bound by an
implied covenant to develop the leased premises. Most of the cases on the
implied development covenant were decided during the times of more
conventional oil and gas development. What might this implied covenant of

I See, e.g., OWEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., HEMINGWAY OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION § 8.1,
at 401-02 (4th ed. 2004); JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 316-352 (5th ed.
2009); MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAw RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS
LEASES § 69, at 176 (2d ed. 1940); 5 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW §§ 831-856.3, at 214.3-388 (rev. ed. 1998); Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil
and Gas Leases-Past, Present & Future, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 639, 644-653 (1994); see
generally George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus
Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 155 (2009); Keith B. Hall, The ContinuingRole of
Implied Covenants in Developing Leased Lands, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 313 (2010); Bruce M.
Kramer, The InteractionBetween the Common Law Implied Covenants to Prevent Drainageand
Market and the Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 15 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1
(1995); James W. McCartney & John C. LaMaster, The Implied Covenant of Exploration in
Texas and Arkansas, 13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCKL. REV. 25 (1990).
2
For information on the history of early development targeting non-shale formations
in the
Appalachian Basin states, including Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, see JAMES W.
ADAMS ET AL., PENNSYLVANIA OIL AND GAS LAW AND PRACTICE

§§

1.1-1.2, at 1-1 to -4 (2012);

OHIO OIL & GAS Ass'N, Ohio Crude Oil & Natural Gas Producing Industry,
http://burchfieldcraig.org/FamLib/FamBus/OilGasGeneral/OhioOilandGaslndustryOverviewOOGA.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); R.T. Ryder, Appalachian Basin Province (067) 1-5,
available at http://certmapper.cr.usgs.gov/data/noga95/prov67/text/prov67.pdf,
W. Va.
Geological & Econ. Survey, History of WV Mineral Industries-Oil and Gas,
http://www.wvgs.wvnet.edu/www/geology/geoldvog.htm (last updated July 16, 2004).
For example, the Marcellus Shale covers roughly 48,000 square miles. See John A. Harper,
The Marcellus Shale-An Old "New" Gas Reservoir in Pennsylvania, 38 PA. GEOLOGY 2, 2
(2008).
4
These shale formations underlie many other states including New York, Kentucky,
Maryland, Tennessee, and Virginia, and parts of Ontario, Canada (in the case of the Utica). See

Hobart King, Utica Shale-The Natural Gas Giant Below the Marcellus, GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/articles/utica-shale (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). Much of the current
development activity is taking place in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.
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development mean in the shale gas context given the potential for commercial
natural gas production from shale formations using new technologies?
The goal of this Article is to revisit some of the general principles
regarding the implied covenant of development in states to the west and in the
northeast where shale gas development is off and running. To that end, Part II
of this Article provides an overview of some of the general features of shale gas
development. Part III reviews case law and commentary on the implied
covenant of reasonable development and the so-called "further exploration"
covenant, with a particular emphasis on several factors that may be relevant in
the shale gas context and on remedies recognized by the courts if a lessor
establishes a breach. Part IV summarizes the case law on the implied
development covenant in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia and identifies
some scenarios in which lessors may assert claims. Part V provides a brief
conclusion.
II. SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT
As noted above, most of the case law over the past century involves
claims that lessees breached the implied covenant in the context of more
conventional oil or gas development. Shale gas development is different from
conventional developments in ways that may be relevant to courts when they
resolve disputes over whether a lessee has complied with any implied covenant
of developing a leasehold. Although there are similarities, shale gas
development tends to be a little more complicated than its conventional
counterpart, tends to take a little more time, and tends to cost a lot more money.
A.

Geology

Shale formations like the Marcellus and Utica are sedimentary rocks of
varying thickness rich in organic matter. They are located at some points
thousands of feet beneath the surface of the Earth.6 The hot subsurface
temperatures, subsurface pressure, and lack of oxygen in the formation,
coupled with a series of chemical reactions over time, transforms the organic
matter in the shale into hydrocarbons such as oil or natural gas.'
Until fairly recently, production companies did not target shale
formations for natural gas development given the complexity and cost of the

5

Traditional Oil and Natural Gas

Industry, PA.

INDEP.

OIL

&

GAS

ASS'N,

http://www.pioga.org/pa-oil-gas/traditional (last visited Mar. 19, 2013) ("These segments of the
industry have a number of similarities, along with a number of differences.").
6
See Harper,supra note 3, at 8 (noting varying depth and thickness of the Marcellus).
7

See, e.g., JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 5-7 (6th ed.

2013);

MARTIN

S.

RAYMOND

&

WILLIAM

L. LEFFLER, OIL

AND

GAS

PRODUCTION IN

NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE 56-57 (2006).
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venture and the lack of technology that would make production commercially
viable.8 Most producers targeted more "conventional" shallow formations like
sandstones overlying the Marcellus Shale in Western Pennsylvania as depicted
in Figure 1 below.
Generalized Geologic Cross Section Showing

Marcellus Shale in Western Pennsylvania

Figure 1: Location of Shale Relative to Other Formations
9
Image Courtesy of Marcellus Centerfor Outreach and Research

Yet, given its potential as an energy source, public and private entities
gained interest beginning in the mid-1970s with the "Eastern Gas Shales
Project," a federally funded program designed to evaluate the potential for
natural gas production from the Devonian and Mississippian shale formations
in the Appalachian Basin. 10 In 1981, George Mitchell's company (Mitchell
Energy, later acquired by Devon Energy Corporation) drilled a well targeting
8
Harper, supra note 3, at 2 ("In reality, the Marcellus has been a known gas reservoir for
more than 75 years. What has made it newsworthy, besides much hyperbole, is that the oil and
gas industry has both new technology and price incentives that make this otherwise difficult gas
play economical.").
Generalized Geologic Cross Section Showing Marcellus Shale in Western Pennsylvania,
MCOR, http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/images/3D-section.gif (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
10 ROBERT G. PIOTROWSKI & JOHN A. HARPER, BLACK SHALE AND SANDSTONE FACIES OF THE

DEVONIAN "CATSKILL" CLASTIC WEDGE IN THE SUBSURFACE OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA 6-8

(1979). The report is available at the National Energy Technology Laboratory website at
http://www.netl.doe.gov/kmd/cds/disk7/diskl/EGS%/ 5CBlack%/2OShale%/20and%/o20Sandstone%/
20Facies%20ofo20the%/o20Devonian%/o20%/ 27Catskill%/27%/20.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/6

4

Bibkos: A Review of the Implied Covenant of Development in the Shale Gas
953

A REVIEW OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT

2013]

the Barnett Shale in Texas. Despite his engineers telling him, "[y]ou're
throwing your money away," Mitchell and his team spent the next two decades
researching, developing, and refining techniques (including horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracture stimulation) that make shale gas development potentially
economical for some production companies." Range Resources Corporation
and other producers pioneered the development in the Marcellus Shale region.12
This "unconventional" development of natural gas targets the
hydrocarbons in the shale formation itself.13 Because shale is a "tight"
formation that may have sufficient porosity 4 for the accumulation of
hydrocarbons but low permeability, 5 oil and gas cannot flow through shale
with relative ease as compared to common reservoir rocks.16 In addition, the
productive zones of shale formations may be located far deeper in the ground
than some more conventional reservoirs.' 7 Given the depth of the shale and its
geophysical characteristics, different drilling and completion techniques are
required to extract economically viable quantities of hydrocarbons from these
formations, and shale gas extraction operations tend to be much greater in
complexity and scale than their conventional counterparts.
B.

The Life Cycle of a Shale Gas Well

The life cycle of a well targeting a shale formation begins with
preliminary work, such as acquiring a sufficient amount of acreage to support
larger scale operations and deep drilling; conducting larger scale seismic testing
to examine the subsurface of a geographic area that includes the leased

"1
See Jesse Bogan, The Father of Shale Gas, FORBES (July 16, 2009),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/george-mitchell-gas-business-energy-shale.html.
12
Range Resources geologist William A. Zagorski has been referred to as the "Father of the
Marcellus." See Newsroom, Range Geologist Bill Zagorski To Be Honored By AAPG, RANGE
RES.,
http://www.rangeresources.com/Media-Center/Featured-Stories/Range-Geologist-BillZagorski-To-Be-Honored-By-AAP.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
'3
For a good summary of shale gas history and development, see GOVERNOR'S MARCELLUS

SHALE ADVISORY

COMM'N REPORT

§

3.1,

at

13-15

(July 22,

2011),

available at

http://files.dep.state.pa.us/publicparticipation/marcellusshaleadvisorycommission/marcellusshale
advisoryportalfiles/msac final report.pdf.
14
Porosity refers to the spaces between the grains in the rock in which hydrocarbons may
accumulate. The higher the porosity, generally the higher the potential for the presence of
hydrocarbons. NORMAN J. HYNE, NON-TECHNICAL GUIDE TO PETROLEUM GEOLOGY,
EXPLORATION, DRILLING, AND PRODUCTION 512 (2d ed. 2001).
15
Permeability measures the ability of hydrocarbons to flow through a rock. Id. at 510.
1
Id at 152, 156-59.

1

OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, MODERN

A PRIMER E-2 (2009), available at
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/naturalgasgeneral/ShaleGasPrimer
Online 4-2009.pdf.
SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
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properties; obtaining necessary regulatory approvals for drilling the well and
constructing the well pad some of which are specific to shale gas
development as opposed to conventional drilling; surveying the property; siting
well pad and well locations; staking well pad sites; and developing a drilling
and operations plan.18 This process can take many months or years.
Once a production company decides on the location of a well, it
constructs a well site. That involves clearing the well pad area; mobilizing
earthmoving equipment to the site; engaging in earth moving activities to
construct access roads and well pads; building impoundments for storing water;
building other structures; and engaging in other construction activities.
Although there are fewer of them, well pads sufficient to support shale gas
operations are typically larger than well pads that support conventional
operations. Moreover, shale well pads often involve multiple wells drilled on
each pad, reaching down and then out horizontally in a pattern to extract gas
over a large area. Again, this process may take a considerable amount of time.
The key features of shale gas development include horizontal drilling at
greater depths and hydraulic fracture stimulation techniques to crack and prop
open the low-permeability shale formation to release the hydrocarbons.1 9 This
is essential to shale gas development.20
To summarize the process, natural gas producers first drill a vertical
wellbore several thousand feet below the surface of the Earth until they reach
an area above the target shale formation.21 At that "kickoff' point, they then
turn the drill gradually to penetrate and bore through the shale formation
horizontally, typically for approximately 2,000 feet or more, as depicted in
Figure 2 below. 22 As illustrated in Figure 3 below, multilateral drilling allows
operators to branch off from one well or surface location in different directions
to target different subsurface areas and recover resources at different depths or
zones.

George A. Bibikos, Interpreting Oil and Gas Leases in Pennsylvania's
Shale Gas Era,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 31, 2012, at 2.
18

19
20

OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 17, at ES-3 to ES-4.
David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing,72 U. PITT. L. REv.

685, 685 (2011) ("[H]ydraulic fracturing is absolutely necessary to profitably develop oil and gas
from shale rock formations and other 'tight' formations.").
21 Bruce M. Kramer, Poolingfor Horizontal Wells: Can They Teach an Old Dog New Tricks?
55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 8.01, at 8-3 (2009).
22

For a review of lateral lengths for different shale formations, see HALLIBURTON Co.,
U.S.
RESOURCE. UNCONVENTIONAL CHALLENGES 5 (2008),

SHALE GAS: AN UNCONVENTIONAL

available
at
H063771.pdf.

http://www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/shale/related-docs/
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Figure 2: A Horizontal Well
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Figure 3: Multilateral Wells
23

Image Courtesy of Chesapeake Energy

Image Courtesy of Statoil24

After installing steel and cement in the wellbore at various stages of
this drilling process pursuant to state regulations and industry practice,25
producers perforate the horizontal wellbore to expose the shale. They then
inject large amounts of water (or sometimes other fluid) and a small percentage
of sand and other "proppant" into the wellbore under extremely high pressure
to fracture the shale formation and prop open the cracks, as illustrated in Figure
4 below. This allows the gas to flow to the wellbore such that it can be
recovered at the surface.2 6

Hydraulic

Fracturing Facts:
The
Process,
HYDRAULICFRACTURING.COM,
http://www.hydraulicfracturing.com/Process/Pages/Information.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
24 Statoil Strengthens U.S. Shale Gas Position,
STATOIL (Mar. 26, 2010, 10:16 AM),
http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2010/Pages/26MarMarcellus.aspx.
25
For regulatory provisions in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia, see OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1509.03, 1509.17 (LexisNexis 2012); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-08, 9-12-01 (2012);
58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3217-18 (West 2012); 25 PA. CODE §§ 78.72-73, 78.83, 78.83(c),
78.84-85 (amended 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-6A-24 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). For a
cogent summary of the casing and cementing process, see Jeffrey C. King et al., Factual
Causation: The Missing Link in Hydraulic Fracture-GroundwaterContaminationLitigation, 22
23

DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 341, 351-52 (2012).
26
OFFICE OF RES. & DEV., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH

STUDY (2010), availableat http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hfresearchstudyfs.pdf; OFFICE
OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT'L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 17, at ES-3 to ES-4, 56-64; Bruce
M. Kramer, Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust: Some New Paradigmsfor the Rule
of Capture and Implied Covenant Jurisprudence,30 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. ch. 11, at 331-32
(2009).
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Figure 4: Close-up Illustration of Fractures in Shale Formation
2

Image Courtesy of U.S. DepartmentofEnergy NationalEnergy Technology Laboratory

Whereas a good conventional gas well in Appalachia might account for
several hundred or several thousand cubic feet of gas per day,28 a shale gas well
in the Marcellus (for example) initially may produce several million cubic feet
of gas per day.29 However, production rates tend to decline rapidly for shale gas
wells and may require several stages of hydraulic fracture stimulation to
enhance recovery.3
C.

Costs of Shale Gas Development

The costs of shale gas development tend to be much higher than
conventional operations.3 Among other costs, drilling and completions account
for a great portion of investment in shale gas development. Reports vary, but a
See, e.g., Schematic
of
Hydraulic
Fracturing, U.S.
DEPT.
ENERGY,
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/images/programs/oilgas/hydraulic fracturinglarge.jpg (last visited
Mar. 22, 2013).
28
Tom Yerace, Amid Natural Gas DrillingBoom, Conventional Wells HoldEdge, TRIBLIVE,
Nov. 18, 2012, http://triblive.com/neighborhoods/yourallekiskivalley/2912294-87/gas-wellsbrown-weaver-natural-marcellus-companies-conventional-business-lot#axzz2N56t5upw
(recounting interviews with operators estimating conventional well production).
29
Rafael Sandrea, Evaluating ProductionPotential of Mature US Oil, Gas Shale Plays, OIL
& GAS J. (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/vol-110/issue-12/explorationdevelopment/evaluating-production-potential-of-mature-us-oil.html.
30
Id
27

3
For an economic analysis, see Ryan Duman, Economic Viability of Shale Gas Production
in the Marcellus Shale; Indicated by Production Rates, Costs, and Current Natural Gas Prices 23
(2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Michigan Technological University) (on file with J. Robert Van
Pelt and John and Ruanne Opie Library, Michigan Technological University), available at
http://services.lib.mtu.edu/etd/THESIS/2012/Business&Economics/duman/thesis.pdf.
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safe estimate is that one shale gas well with one lateral might cost anywhere
from five to ten million dollars when considering costs of well pad
construction, drilling and casing, and hydraulic fracture stimulation
operations. 32 The costs may increase depending upon the number of horizontal
legs drilled from a well or surface location or the need for additional fracture
stimulation after initial production. Given the high costs of development,
natural gas prices may influence business decisions to drill and complete a well
or more wells.
III. IMPLIED COVENANT OF REASONABLE DEVELOPMENT

With that background in mind, the question then becomes how the
implied covenant of reasonable development may play a role in resolving
disputes over whether operators have performed their obligations under an oil
and gas lease. This may be a significant issue given the opportunities that shale
gas development presents for production companies and their lessors in the
form of royalties.
As a threshold matter, a lease is a transaction mixed with concepts of
property and contract law. 33 Under the express terms of a typical oil and gas
lease, a lessor (usually a landowner) conveys his or her oil and gas interests to a
lessee (usually a production company) in exchange for the opportunity to
receive royalties on production. The lessee, in turn, takes the cost-bearing,
"working interest" 3 4 in the oil and gas and bargains for the right (but not the
obligation) to produce the resources for as long as it is profitable to do so.3
Although there are a variety of provisions, particularly in modem lease forms,
the agreement may not always specify all the details of a particular part of the
relationship.36 Over time, absent express language in the agreement, courts
have, under certain circumstances, implied certain covenants into the lease.

32
For a summary of cost data regarding horizontal wells, see generally Taha Murtuza Husain
et al., Penn State, Final Project Report: Economic Comparison of Multi-Lateral Drilling over
Horizontal Drilling for Marcellus Shale Field Development § 1.8, at 50 (Jan. 5, 2011)
(unpublished report) (on file with Derek Elsworth, Pennsylvania State University),
available
at
http://www.ems.psu.edu/-elsworth/courses/egee580/201 1/Final%20Reports/
fishbone-report.pdf. See generally Duman, supra note 31.
33
Bibikos & King, supra note 1, at 160-61.
34
The "working interest" is "[t]he operating interest under an oil and gas lease. The owner of
the working interest has the exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land." 8 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 1, at 1191. For example, in a lease calling for a one-eighth royalty on
production, the working interest is seven-eighths. Id.
3
LowE, supra note 1,at 170.
36
Gary B. Conine, Speculation, Prudent Operation, and the Economics of Oil and Gas, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 670, 674 (1994) ("For all its importance, the typical lease is relatively brief and
the terms of the grant are contained in a few express clauses.").
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The sections that follow revisit the general rules regarding the lessee's
implied standard of performance in a lease, the general rules regarding the
implied covenant of development, and several factors that courts have
evaluated over the years that may have some significance in contemporary
disputes.
A.

Lessee's StandardofPerformance

Courts in most oil and gas producing jurisdictions have concluded that
a lessee is bound by a certain standard of performance. Under the "prudent
operator" standard of performance followed by many states, including West
Virginia and Ohio, 39 a lessee must perform under the lease as would a
reasonable and prudent operator in the same or similar circumstances,
recognizing the "special skills and expertise regarding oil and gas operations."4o
The prudent operator standard generally requires that a lessee perform its
obligations pursuant to the lease in good faith, competently, and with due
regard to the interests of both the lessor and the lessee. 4'
Courts in other states, particularly Pennsylvania, have taken a more
narrow, subjective approach and have focused on a particular lessee's good
faith judgment in performing under the lease rather than a hypothetical prudent

37
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 802, at 3-6; see, e.g., Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc
Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905). See generally Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp.,
292 U.S. 272 (1934); Stoddard v. Emery, 18 A. 339 (Pa. 1889).
Among others, Arkansas, California Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
and Texas have adopted the "prudent operator" standard. 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, §
806.3, at 36-40; see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Ware, 602 S.W.2d 620 (Ark. 1980); Hartman Ranch
Co. v. Assoc. Oil Co., 73 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1937); Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 125
P.2d 964 (Colo. 1942); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 732 P.2d 679 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986);
Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 105 N.E. 308 (Ill. 1914); Kan. Baptist Convention v. Mesa Operating
L.P., 864 P.2d 204 (Kan. 1993); McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957); Caddo Oil
& Mining Co. v. Producers' Oil Co., 64 So. 684 (La. 1914); Compton v. Fisher-McCall, Inc., 299
N.W. 750 (Mich. 1941); Sw. Gas Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966); Fey v. A.
A. Oil Corp., 285 P.2d 578 (Mont. 1955); George v. Jones, 95 N.W.2d 609 (Neb. 1959); Libby v.
De Baca, 179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947); Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1984); Harris v.
Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897); N. Am. Petroleum Co. v. Knight, 321 P.2d 964 (Okla.
1958); Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Barker, 6 S.W.2d 1031 (Tex. 1928); Goldstein v. Lindner,
648 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
39
Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369-70 (W. Va. 1913); see also Harris v. Ohio Oil
Co., 48 N.E. 502, 505 (Ohio 1897); St. Luke's United Methodist Church v. CNG Dev. Co., 663
S.E.2d 639, 645-46 (W. Va. 2008) (recognizing the prudent-operator rule in West Virginia).
40

ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 433.

41

LOWE, supranote 1, at 311.
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operator.42 Courts applying this standard defer to the lessee's good faith
judgment in performing its obligations under the contract unless the lessor
demonstrates bad faith or fraud.43
Whichever standard applies, a lessee is under no obligation to operate
at a loss. To the contrary, the lessee is entitled to a reasonable return on its
investment.4 As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Brewster v.
Lanyon Zinc Co. 45 explained long ago in one of the first implied covenant
cases:
The large expense incident to the work of exploration and
development, and the fact that the lessee must bear the loss if
the operations are not successful, require that he proceed with
due regard to his own interests, as well as those of the lessor.
No obligation rests on him to carry the operations beyond the
point where they will be profitable to him, even if some benefit
to the lessor will result from them.46
The principle espoused in Brewster and cases that followed over the
past century 47 makes sense. From a purely economic perspective, the lessor's
position can only get better with further development of the leasehold by the
lessee. The lessor's royalty interest is not cost-bearing. 48 The lessor stands to

42
T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 276-78 (Pa. 2012); Colgan v. Forest
Oil Co., 45 A. 119, 121 (Pa. 1899); Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899).
43
Adams v. Stage, 18 Pa. Super. 308, 312 (1901) ("If the judgment of the defendant was
exercised in good faith, and involved no manifestly fraudulent use of opportunities, we cannot
say that he failed to discharge any duty to the plaintiff arising out of his contract and the
operations thereunder.").
44
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.3, at 407. In the context of the development covenant,
[t]he lessee is not required to further develop unless it will be profitable.
Because the lessor has retained a royalty interest (free of the cost of
production) any development that results in production should be regarded as
profitable to the lessor. On the other hand, the lessee bears the direct costs of
drilling and development and assumes the direct risk of dry holes or
unprofitable production. Thus, the lessee generally has no duty to further
develop if the lessee is unlikely to achieve a profitable production.

Id
140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
Id. at 814.
47
See id. See generally Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
48
The lessor's royalty interest means that the lessor "is entitled to a share of production, if, as
and when there is production, free of the costs of production." 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 1, at 952. The lessor does not share in production costs. The lessee bears those expenses.
"Production activities . . . include all the activities necessary to extract oil or gas from the earth
and bring it to the wellhead on the surface. These include exploring, drilling, installing, and
maintaining a well; reworking a well; hydraulic fracturing .. . for natural gas; and other upstream
activities." Bibikos & King, supra note 1, at 168.
45

46
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receive production royalties free of production costs and will be no worse off if
the lessee's investment yields no return. In other words, if it were solely up to
the lessor, the lessee would be required to operate at all costs.
In contrast to the lessor's economic position, the lessee's position may
get better if exploration and development is profitable, but it may get worse if
the efforts yield nothing. The lessee's interest is cost bearing, and the lessee is
not interested in activities that have no realistic expectation of profit. The law
on implied covenants accounts for the reality that the lessee is not the lessor's
fiduciary 49 or agent,50 and the lessor cannot demand that his lessee be a
"perpetual wildcatter"5 1 or be the sole arbiter of the lessee's performance
obligations given the expectation of both parties to profit from the relationship.
B.

ReasonableDevelopment

In addition to a lessee's implied standard of performance, courts have
recognized a number of specific implied covenants, such as the duty to protect
against drainage or the duty to market production.5 2 One of the more frequently
litigated issues has been the implied covenant of reasonable development.
Simply stated, absent lease language to the contrary, a lessee is under an
implied obligation to develop the leased premises with reasonable diligence.53
1.

Limitations

Properly understood, an implied covenant to develop only arises after a
lessee obtains production from a proven formation that yields oil or natural gas

See Crim Truck & Tractor v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.
1992); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Hagen, 31 TEx. SUP. CT. J. 140, 142 (1987); Atl. Richfield Co. v.
Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439, 439-44 (Tex. App. 1995); Wellman v. Bobcat Oil & Gas, Inc.,
No. 3:10-0147, 2010 WL 2720748, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (finding that the lessee is not a
fiduciary).
5o
Atl. Richfield Co., 860 S.W.2d at 445.
51
MERRILL, supra note 1, at 176.
52
See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 641-44 (reviewing the drainage covenant, among others);
David E. Pierce, Exploring the Jurisprudential Underpinnings of the Implied Covenant to
Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MrN. L. INsT. 10-1, at § 10.05 (2002) (discussing the marketing
covenant); Bibikos & King, supra note 1, at 160-67 (reviewing drainage, development, and
marketing covenants in case law from the Marcellus Shale states).
S3 See, e.g., 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 832, at 221 & n.l (citing Standard Oil
Co. of La. v. Giller, 38 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1931); State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Co. v. Worden,
103 P.2d 124 (N.M. 1940); Goldstein v. Lindner, 648 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)); see
also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.3, at 405 & n.1 (citing Berry v. Wondra, 246 P.2d 282
(Kan. 1952); McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957); Coats v. Brown, 301 S.W.2d
932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928)).
49
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in paying quantities.54 The development covenant does not compel the lessee to
drill an exploratory well during the primary term.55 Once a lessee elects to drill
a well and a formation yields production in paying quantities, the lessee
generally is under an implied obligation to drill a sufficient number of
additional wells in order to extract the oil and gas from that "proven"
formation.56
The implied covenant may be limited by the express terms of the lease
or by payments in lieu of development. As noted by courts and commentators,
one of the reasons for implying certain covenants in a lease is that the parties
cannot possibly express all the details of the transaction and that courts should
fill in the gaps in the lease with implied promises that both parties must have
contemplated given the nature of their agreement.
However, if the express terms of a lease limit the application of any
implied covenant of reasonable development, the express terms should
control.5 ' The lease may disclaim the implied development covenant

54
5 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 58.1, at 66-67 (1991)
(noting that most jurisdictions have concluded there is an implied duty to further develop after
production has been established).
5
An "exploratory well" is different from a "development well." An exploratory well is
[a] well drilled in unproven or semi-proven territory for the purpose of
ascertaining the presence underground of a commercial petroleum deposit.
To be contrasted is the term development well .

.

. which refers to a well

drilled with the expectation of producing from a known productive
formation, and which is located in accordance with spacing regulations and
field development requirements.
8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 367. Although once recognized, any implied duty to drill
an exploratory well is obsolete in light of modem lease provisions that give lessees the
opportunity to pay for the right to keep the lease alive during the primary term without drilling
any well.
56
See 5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 832, at 221 & n.l (citing Standard Oil Co. of
La. v. Giller, 38 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1931); State ex rel Shell Petroleum Co. v. Worden, 103 P.2d
124 (N.M. 1940); Goldstein v. Lindner, 648 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002));
see
also
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.3, at 405-06 & nn.1, 3 (citing Berry v. Wondra, 246 P.2d
282 (Kan. 1952); McMahan v. Boggess, 302 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1957); Coats v. Brown, 301
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Stuard, 7 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928)); 5 KUNTz, supra note 54 (noting that most jurisdictions have concluded there is an
implied duty to further develop after production has been established).
57 For an excellent explanation of why courts imply certain covenants in leases, and why they
sometimes should not, see Pierce, supra note 52.
58
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.1, at 402 ("To the extent these matters are addressed in
a lessee-oriented lease, express provisions tend to limit what would otherwise be the implied
obligation.").
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altogether. 59 If the covenant is disclaimed, courts should enforce the agreement
as written and not read an otherwise disclaimed provision into the lease.o
If not expressly disclaimed, the implied covenant of development may
be limited if it conflicts with other provisions of the lease. For example, many
leases-particularly older leases-may specify the number of wells that the
lessee agreed to drill. 1 If a provision in the lease specifies the number of wells,
that number should control, and there should be no implied covenant to drill
more. 62
In addition, courts have held that there is no implied duty to develop
while a lessor receives certain payment in lieu of development.63 For example,
most leases give lessees the option to keep a lease alive during the primary term
(and thus maintain the exclusive right but not the obligation to drill a well) by
payment of delay rentals. The delay-rental payment "is uniformly held to bar
implication of a covenant to reasonably develop the land." 64 Similarly, many
leases may provide for other forms of compensation in lieu of active
development, such as storage payments,65 to compensate the lessor during
times of non-development.

For an example provision, see JoHN S. LOWE ET AL., FORMS MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY
157-58 (5th ed. 2008).
60
Bodcaw Oil Co. v. Atl. Ref. Co., 228 S.W.2d 626, 634 (Ark. 1950) (recognizing that
the
lease disclaimed the obligation to produce to maintain the lease, the court did "not feel warranted
in reading into the lease and agreement an intention directly opposite to that expressed by the
parties").
61
Some regulatory programs created by state conservation laws may specify the number
of
wells a lessee may drill and, thus, limit any implied covenant to drill additional wells.
62
See, e.g., Lundin/Weber Co. v. Brea Oil Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 774 (Ct. App. 2004)
("[T]he express provisions of the 1995 Lease conflict with the implied covenant of further
exploration.... [W]here parties have chosen not to extend the obligation to explore for oil or gas
beyond the discovery and development of paying quantities, a court should not insert obligations
in direct conflict with the limitation expressed by the parties."); Stoddard v. Emery, 18 A. 339,
339 (Pa. 1889) (stating that when the lease provides for a fixed number of wells to be drilled, no
implied covenant is needed to further develop); Gulf Prod. Co. v. Kishi, 103 S.W.2d 965, 969
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1937) (stating that because the lease specified the number of wells, the court
would not imply any obligation to drill more).
Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 455 (Pa. 2001); Hutchinson v. Sunbeam
Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 389 (Pa. 1986) (noting that the implied duty to develop will not be
imposed when the lease provides for payment in lieu of development); lafolla v. Douglas
Pocahontas Coal Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128, 132 (W. Va. 1978) (noting that in a coal case, minimum
royalty payments excused development); cf lonno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 443 N.E.2d 504, 505-07
(Ohio 1983) (stating that the minimum royalties for clay/coal mining did not preclude a claim of
forfeiting lease for breach of development covenant).
6
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 835-835.1, at 255-56 (citing Harris v. Ohio Oil
Co., 48 N.E. 502 (Ohio 1897); Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 89 S.E. 12 (W. Va. 1916)).
65
See, e.g., Penneco Pipeline Corp. v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., Civ. Nos. 05-49, 05537, 2007 WL 1847391 (W.D. Pa. June 25, 2007). But see Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp.,
5

CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW
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Factors

Absent express limitations in the lease or a payment in lieu of
development, courts have entertained claims that a lessee breached an implied
covenant to develop. Although the courts usually consider the totality of
circumstances, some of the recurring questions are: (1) how long has it been
since the lessee drilled the last producing well targeting the proven formation?;
and (2) would drilling an additional well or wells targeting the proven
formation be prudent and profitable to the lessee? Another consideration may
be the advent of new technology for development. The ultimate job for the
courts resolving disputes is to "strike a balance between the number of
development wells necessary to withdraw the minerals at a fair rate to the
lessor and the number of wells the lessee can afford to drill and still receive a
fair return for the risk he takes on the investment he makes."66
Thus, if a significant amount of time has passed since the last
producing well, that may suggest to lessors that the producer has not pursued
further development of the proven formation with due diligence. Mere delay,
however, is almost always insufficient in itself to establish a breach of the
implied development covenant. 7 Courts have refused to grant the lessor any
relief in cases involving delays in development from anywhere between several
years68 and several decades. 69
Another consideration that factors into whether further development is
"prudent" is the advent of new technology since completion of the last
producing well or wells. Some courts have suggested that the implied covenant
may require that lessees utilize improved technologies to enhance recovery
from a proven formation.70
332 F. Supp. 2d 759, 773 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (stating that the storage payment was insufficient to
overcome the duty to develop).
66
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 832.2, at 232.
67
In Oklahoma, courts have held that if a significant amount of time has passed since the last
development well, the burden shifts to the lessee to justify the delay, but mere delay is not
enough. Crocker v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265, 270 (Okla. 1965) ("While a long delay in
development is not in and of itself sufficient basis for cancellation of an oil and gas lease, it is
incumbent upon the lessee to adequately explain such delay. Even a prudent operator must
excuse his unreasonable delay." (citing Trust Co. of Chi. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 192 F.2d 282
(10th Cir. 1951)); see also Blythe v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 271 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1959).
68 Sun Oil Co. v. Frantz, 291 F.2d 52, 54 (10th Cir. 1961) (stating that a lapse of time
is "not
[at] all controlling" and citing cases finding no breach of development covenant for lapse of time
ranging from nine to fourteen years).
69
Jensen v. Rudman P'ship & Hess Corp., No. 4:10-cv-00027, 2011 WL 1791102, at *7 (D.
N.D. May 10, 2011) (stating that an alleged unreasonable delay of sixty years, without more, was
insufficient to cancel a lease).
70
Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720, 721 (La. 1942) (explaining that the lessee
breached covenant for not developing wells "in accordance with the new and successful methods
of development used by others in this . . . oil field"); Waseco Chem. & Supply Co. v. Bayou
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However, given that implied covenants are designed to assure that both
parties benefit from development of the leasehold, the key question usually is
whether the lessor can meet the burden of proving that the proposed additional
development would be profitable to the lessee. In this context, "profitability"
means production from the well sufficient to repay the operator its capital
investment and operating costs plus a reasonable profit.7 2 If a lessor is unable to
prove that the proposed development is such that the lessee can recoup the
costs of its investment plus a reasonable profit, the lessor is not entitled to
relief.
Suppose, for example, that a lessee acquires a lease on a fifty-acre
tract, constructs a five-acre well pad, and drills one horizontal well that
produces from a shale formation. If the circumstances are such that additional
stages of fracturing, additional laterals, or additional wells would result in a
loss to the lessee, neither the prudent operator standard nor the subjective good
faith standard requires further development of the producing formation even
though the additional development may well generate more royalties for the
lessor.
3.

Remedy

If a lessor establishes a breach of the implied covenant of reasonable
development, to what remedy is the lessor entitled? The vast majority of courts,
including courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia, 7 3 agree that
damages are the usual remedy for a breach of the implied development
covenant.74 The usual measure is lost royalties as a result of the breach offset

State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305, 306, 310-12 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that the lessee's
failure to use the fireflood method of oil recovery constituted a "failure to diligently develop the
leased premises as a reasonably prudent operator"); Cynthia M. Frazier, Note, The Prudent
OperatorStandard: Does It Include a Duty to Use EnhancedRecovery?, 40 LA. L. REv. 974, 984
(1980).
71
Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 693-694 (Tex. 1959).
72

5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 832.1, at 225.

7
See, e.g., Moore v. Adams, No. 2007AP090066, 2008 WL 4907590, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 17, 2008) ("Ohio courts have recognized that forfeiture is an appropriate remedy when legal
damages resulting from a contractual breach are inadequate; upon a breach of implied covenants;
upon a claim of abandonment; or when necessary to do justice."); Girolami v. Peoples Natural
Gas Co., 76 A.2d 375, 377 (Pa. 1950) (noting that damages, rather than forfeiture, is the adequate
remedy for breach of covenant to pay royalties); St. Luke's United Methodist Church v. CNG
Dev. Co., 663 S.E.2d 639, 642 n.14 (W. Va. 2008).
74
See, e.g., Meaher v. Getty Oil Co., 450 So. 2d 443, 447 (Ala. 1984) ("After reviewing the
recognized authorities on the subject, we are of the opinion that the majority view is the most
persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that an action for damages is the proper remedy for breach of
the implied covenants to develop, produce, market, and prevent drainage. Only in the
extraordinary circumstances where damages are wholly inadequate as a remedy will our courts,
exercising equity jurisdiction, subject the lease to cancellation."); Alford v. Dennis, 170 P. 1005
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against future production and royalties to prevent the lessor from recovering the
same royalties twice.
Courts generally view the alternative remedy that lessors frequently
seek-cancellation of an oil and gas lease-as an extreme remedy. There are
two reasons. Compliance with any implied development covenant is not a
condition on the continuation of the lease. Rather, it addresses a complaint of
lessors that the lessee breached an implied promise to develop the leased
premises with reasonable diligence under the circumstances. Second, the law
abhors a forfeiture. Cancellation would amount to a forfeiture of a protected
interest in real property and substantial investments in production pursuant to
an oil and gas lease.76
C.

FurtherExploration

Although not widely recognized as a separate covenant and not adopted
in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia,n Professor Charles Meyers
suggested, long before the shale gas revolution, a separate implied covenant
that would require a lessee to "further explore" the leased premises to discover
and ultimately produce from unproven or possibly deeper strata. Under the
so-called further exploration covenant, a lessee would have an implied duty
(absent express language to the contrary) to explore potentially productive but
unproven strata on the leased premises.7 9
The rationale advocated for this implied exploration covenant is
essentially two-fold. First, courts have suggested that lessees should not hold
leases indefinitely solely for speculative purposes. Second, courts have
suggested that a lessor should not be bound indefinitely by some production on
the leased premises when known, untested, and potentially productive
formations may generate additional royalties for the lessor.80

(Kan. 1918); Sw. Gas Producing Co. v. Seale, 191 So. 2d 115 (Miss. 1966); Waggoner Estate v.
Sigler Oil Co., 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).
7
Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626, 638-39 (W. Va. 1962) (adopting
the lost royalties damage model subject to lessee given credit against future production in order
to prevent double recovery); Kramer, supra note 26, at 369-70.
76 See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th
Cir. 1979); Lowery v. May,
104 So. 5 (Ala. 1925); HNG Fossil Fuels Co. v. Roach, 656 P.2d 879 (N.M. 1982); lonno v.
Glen-Gery Corp., 443 N.E. 2d 504 (Ohio 1983); Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Bishop, 441 P. 2d 436
(Okla. 1967); Penn-Ohio Gas Co. v. Franks' Heirs, 185 A. 280, 281 (Pa. 1936); Batex Oil Co. v.
LaBrisa Land & Cattle Co., 352 S.W. 2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
"
See discussion infra Part IV.
7
Charles Meyers, The Implied Covenant of FurtherExploration, 34 TEX. L. REv. 553, 557
(1956).
7
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 831, at 214.3.
80 Meyers, supra note 78, at 558-60 (citing Doss Oil Royalty Co. v. Tex. Co., 137 P.2d 934,
938 (Okla. 1943) (recognizing the implied covenant of further exploration of unproven areas as
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The further exploration covenant is controversial, particularly because
Professor Meyers suggested there is no need for the lessor to prove that further
exploration would be profitable.8 1 As noted above, the standards of
performance, and the reasonable development covenant, require the lessor to
prove that additional wells will yield a profit above production and operating
costs. To many, it would seem questionable that a lessee would be under an
implied obligation to put significant funds at risk to explore the potential for
producing from unproven formations, while under a lesser duty as a prudent
operator to expand production in existing formations only when proven
profitable. Courts in prominent oil and gas producing jurisdictions such as
Texas and Oklahoma have flatly rejected a separate covenant of further
exploration given that the prudent operator standard demands an evaluation of
profitability to the lessee.82
1.

Limitations

Whatever the controversy over the existence of a separate covenant to
explore or the extent of the profitability element, the reality for operators is
that many courts-including courts in jurisdictions that have expressly
disavowed a separate further exploration covenant-have long entertained
claims that a lessee should further explore other unproven or deeper strata on
the leased premises if it would be profitable to do so.
However, the usual threshold issues may limit the applicability of any
covenant to explore further. As noted above, the express terms of the contract

necessary to prevent operators from holding leases for speculative purposes)); see also Sauder v.
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 281 (1934) (holding that a lease for speculative
purposes breaches the prudent-operator rule).
8
See James A. Boone, Implied Covenantfor Additional Development, 31 Miss. L.J. 34, 4244 (1960) (recounting the vigorous debate between Professor Meyers and Earl Brown, a lawyer
who eschewed any implied covenant of further exploration that would impose additional burdens
on lessees).
82
Schnell v. Hudson, 490 N.E.2d 1052, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Mitchell v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981) ("We thus hold there is no implied covenant to further
explore after paying production is obtained, as distinguished from the implied covenant to further
develop."); Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); Clifton v.
Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696-97 (Tex. 1959) ("We hold that there is no implied covenant to
explore as distinguished from the implied covenant to conduct additional development after
production in paying quantities has been obtained. . . . This theory [of a separate further
exploration covenant] is untenable and is diametrically opposed to our established 'prudent
operator' rule where expectation of profit is an essential element.").
8
Commentators have noted that even under Professor Meyer's theory, economic factors still
play a significant role in determining whether a lessee has an implied duty of further exploration
or has breached any such duty. LOWE, supra note 1, at 324-30.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/6

18

Bibkos: A Review of the Implied Covenant of Development in the Shale Gas
A REVIEW OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT

2013]

967

should control, as should payments in lieu of active development.84 In addition,
courts have held that, in the context of assignments of oil and gas leases, the
implied covenant of reasonable development is not divisible after a lessee
assigns rights to another;8 5 the covenant applies to the lease as a whole such
that satisfying the covenant by one assignee for one part of the leased premises
should satisfy the covenant for the entire leased premiseS86 (presumably both
vertically and horizontally).87
2.

Factors

If a further exploration covenant applies, the test generally has been
stated as very fact-intensive, focusing on whether the operator unreasonably
refrained from exploring unproven or deeper formations within the bounds of
the leased premises under all the circumstances, including evidence of proven
formations in the area, the amount of time that lapsed since discovery of a
proven formation in the area or elsewhere on the property, and the feasibility of
further exploration and development.88
As with the reasonable exploration covenant, delay in further exploring
the leased premises may be a relevant factor, but it is not dispositive. For
example, if a lessee has produced from shallow formations since 1950 and a
lessor sues in 2013 for failure to explore and develop the Marcellus or Utica
Shale, the lessor cannot claim that the lessee failed to explore the shale
formation for over sixty years given that horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracture stimulation techniques have only recently been utilized for commercial
development of deep shale formations in the northeast and elsewhere.89
84
See supra notes 33 & 43 and accompanying text; see also Lundin/Weber Co. v. Brea Oil
Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 774 (Ct. App. 2004) (discussing how express terms conflicted with any
implied covenant of further exploration); Smith v. Long, 578 P.2d 232 (Colo. App. 1978)
(explaining how a uranium lode lease expressly excused any duty of further exploration).
85
See, e.g., Oag v. Desert Gas Exploration Co., 659 N.Y.S.2d 654 (App. Div. 1997).
86
See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. Gruy, 720 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App. 1986) (holding that a
lapse of twenty-six years did not result in breach of development of deep rights under the
assigned lease); Labbe v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 350 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
("Oil having been discovered in paying quantitics on a part of the lease, it is thereby perpetuated
as long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, and the lease cannot be regarded as
abandoned as to parts of the lease where no wells have been drilled, or as to any lower strata not
developed.").
87
See, e.g., Felmont Oil Corp. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) ("[T]he law of Texas is well settled that the lessor may not subdivide or separate the
single unified obligation, and thus impose a subsequent burden on his lessee greater than the
burden assumed by such lessee when he accepted the lease.").
88
5 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, § 841, at 267-68 (collecting factors from cases).
89
Crocker v. Humble Oil Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265, 274 (Okla. 1965) (The court refused to
cancel lease for failure to develop additional wells before hydraulic fracturing techniques but
cancelling the lease for lessee's failure to develop wells after advent of hydraulic fracture
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Likewise, courts have been reluctant to find a breach if the lessee has
expressed at least some interest in testing or developing unproven or deeper
strata. 90 Courts have concluded that there is no breach for failure to further
explore parts of a leasehold if a lessee engages in any number of activities short
of drilling an exploratory well, such as exploring the possibility of targeting
other unproven or deeper formations, 91 pursuing farmout 9 2 arrangements for
test wells targeting the unproven formation, 93 or engaging in geophysical

testing. 94
If an implied covenant of further exploration applies, the particular
lessee's circumstances may be very significant in determining the feasibility of
testing unproven strata. This may be a key issue in the Marcellus and Utica
Shale states.
Some lessees, for example, may have leases held by production from
shallow formations on small tracts that are unsuitable for larger operations or
have scattered acreage throughout a region such that they cannot be combined
to form a larger unit to support a more vigorous drilling program.95 Similarly, if
new technology available to a shallow gas operator allows theoretical recovery

stimulation techniques given lessee's use of the technology on other leases in the area. The court
stated that "[t]he defendant admits the use and value of sandfracing. During the years 1957-1961
the defendant sandfraced 100 wells. The defendant cannot offer any reasonable excuse in its
failure to utilize the sandfracing process for further development of the cancelled portion of the
lease"); see also Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Prod. Co., 896 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1995)
(explaining that there was no evidence that extant technology would have revealed commercial
quantities of natural gas).
90
Sun Oil Co. v. Frantz, 291 F.2d 52, 55 (10th Cir. 1961) ("The record shows that lessee has
not been indifferent to the possibilities of development. . . . There is no indication of reluctance
to proceed further with exploratory work. Diligence demands orderly development and does not
require reckless development.").
91
West v. Sun Oil Co., 490 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Okla. 1971) ( "[T]his Court has disapproved
cancellation when the lessee demonstrated a willingness to investigate or test for other producing
formations.") (citing Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Jackson, 489 P.2d 1073 (Okla. 1971); Shell Oil v.
Howell, 208 P.2d 661 (Okla. 1953); Ferguson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 137 P.2d 940 (Okla. 1943);
Skelly Oil Co. v. Boles, 142 P.2d 969 (Okla. 1943)).
9
A "farmout agreement" is a "very common form of agreement between operators, whereby
a lease owner not desirous of drilling at the time agrees to assign the lease, or some portion of it
(in common or in severalty) to another operator who is desirous of drilling the tract." 8 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 1, at 376.

Baker v. Collins, 194 N.E.2d 353, 356 (111.1963) (holding that there was no breach of the
further exploration covenant given in the farmout to the other operator to test unproven
formations that ultimately proved unproductive).
94
Blythe v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 271 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding that there was
no breach of covenant for failure to test deep sands given the lessee's activities short of drilling a
test well).
95
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Smith, 331 S.W.2d 112, 115-16 (Ark. 1960) (holding that there was
no breach of an implied covenant where the lessee did not have enough acreage to justify a test
well to deeper sands).
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from a particular formation, but it is uncertain whether a well will produce
sufficient quantities of oil or gas to pay for the high expense of the new
technology, that may factor into the equation on whether the particular lessee
breached any further exploration covenant. Finally, even if a lessee holds
acreage within a particular region with proven shale formations such as the
Marcellus and Utica, the thickness of the formation coupled with its depth and
geologic history on that particular leasehold might indicate that the availability
of commercially productive wells are less certain.
In short, even in states that apply the prudent operator rule, the
particular lessee's situation may play an increased role in the implied covenant
analysis. As one commentator has noted, "the application of the rule does differ
and is flexible as applied to the facts and circumstances relating to the
development of particular tracts and fields." 96
3.

Remedy

With respect to remedies for breach of any further exploration
covenant, lessors often claim that damages are inadequate because the harm is
the lost opportunity to test another formation for the possibility of production
that may generate additional royalties. Consequently, lessors often request
cancellation so that they may make arrangements for development of the
unproven formation with another lessee.
Still, the usual starting point should be whether the lessor can prove
that he has suffered actual damages, as courts remain reluctant to cancel leases
outright even if they hold a lessee liable for failing to further explore the
premises. In those states that have entertained cancellation as a remedy,
virtually all of them require as a condition to bringing suit that the lessor
provide adequate notice to the lessee and a reasonable opportunity to cure the
alleged breach,97 except in those rare circumstances where the lessor can prove
either that notice is futile or that the lessee intentionally abandoned the

supra note 1, § 8.3, at 409; see also Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E.
368, 370 (W. Va. 1913) ("Of course to the judgment of the operator, when, and where, and how
many wells he shall drill, deference is justly due. But the judgment must be an honest, not an
arbitrary, judgment.").
9
See Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063, 1069-70 (8th Cir. 1979) (Concluding
that under Nebraska law, "[a]n oil and gas lease is a recognized and protected property interest. A
cancellation of an oil and gas lease effects a forfeiture of that interest. The law abhors a
forfeiture. Therefore, an oil and gas lease will not be cancelled for breach of an implied covenant
without the lessor having first given the lessee notice of the breach and demanding that the terms
of the implied covenant be complied with within a reasonable time"); AG Servs., Inc. v. T.W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co., No. CIV.A. 91-0650, 1994 WL 762150, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1994);
St. Luke's United Methodist Church v. CNG Dev. Co., 663 S.E.2d 639, 647 (W. Va. 2008).
96

ANDERSON ET AL.,
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leasehold. 98 The rationale underlying the notice requirement is that the lessee
should be given an opportunity to address the alleged breach, take whatever
steps it deems necessary in light of the allegation, and inform the lessor
whether it intends to forfeit or abandon the lease. 99
In addition, courts in states that entertain cancellation as a remedy have
readily given lessees reasonable amounts of time to engage in further
development on the leased premises or submit plans for future development. 00
If the lessee complies with the court-imposed condition, then cancellation is
unavailable.
Some states require that, before ordering any cancellation of the
leasehold, the lessor prove with sufficient evidence the existence of another
operator ready, willing, and able to develop the undeveloped areas or
formations.o' In particularly active plays in which production companies have
not yet fully staked out their acreage positions, there may be willing operators
in a geographic area to which the lessor can point to support a claim that partial
cancellation of the lease (i.e., cancellation as to particular strata) is a proper
remedy (assuming the other operator, in fact, is ready, willing, and able). If, on
the other hand, production companies for the most part have staked out their
acreage positions in a play and the rate of lease acquisitions has subsided, it
may be difficult for a lessor to find a willing lessee to take on a lease or any
undeveloped portion of the property.
Finally, if a lessee is producing part of the leased premises, the court
will almost never order a total cancellation of the leased premises absent
exceptional circumstances, such as a true and unequivocal abandonment of the

9
Lewis v. Kan. Prod. Co., 199 P.3d 180, 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) ("Also, two apparent
exceptions to the demand-for-compliance rule exist: futility and 'true abandonment."').
9
Superior Oil Co., 604 F.2d at 1069-70 ("The lessee is in effect given a choice of
development or forfeiture."). Many leases contain forfeiture clauses providing that cancellation
of the lease for breach of covenants is unavailable and sometimes expressly require a notice and
cure procedure before a lessor can pursue a forfeiture claim in court.
100
See Gillete v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984) (adopting the further
exploration covenant without requiring proof of profitability and upholding portion of trial court
order conditionally cancelling a lease unless operator submitted a plan of development for nonproducing areas within sixty days), overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Cramer, 808 P.2d
358 (Colo. 1991) (en banc); Lake v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 207 N.E.2d 659 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1965)
(finding that partial cancellation was conditioned on failure to drill exploratory well to proven
strata within one year after court's ruling).
101 See Baker v. Collins, 194 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ill. 1963) (explaining that testifying about the
lease to "people" who had called upon the plaintiffs was vague and insufficient evidence);
Slaaten v. Amareda Hess Corp., 459 N.W.2d 765, 769 (N.D. 1990) ("We add to these [factors
regarding further exploration as] evidence of the willingness of another operator to drill on the
tract in question.").
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entire leasehold' 02 or an admission by the lessee that it will not further develop
any part of the leased premises.103
IV. THE MARCELLUS AND UTICA SHALE STATES
Having outlined the general rules regarding the implied development
covenant against the backdrop of shale gas development, the question then
becomes if and how the courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia have
handled some of these claims. The case law on the implied covenant of
development dates back many years, and the courts in the northeast have yet to
address the issue directly in the context of deep shale gas development.
A.

Scenarios and Claims

In the shale gas context, lessees holding leased acreage by production
from conventional wells tapping shallow formations may be pressed by their
lessors to further explore deeper strata using unconventional techniques
(horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing). Other lessees that have acquired
new leases that are producing from the Marcellus Shale or Utica Shale may be
pressed by their lessors to drill and complete additional laterals or wells to
generate more royalties. Similarly, lessees actively producing from the
Marcellus Shale may be pressed by their lessors to further explore the
underlying Utica. These are merely a few of the potential scenarios.
The claims may take a variety of forms. They may include, among
others, allegations of unreasonable delay since the last producing well, failure
to use technologies available to enhance production from proven formations
and tap resources in deeper strata, and failure to use advanced exploration
technology like seismic testing to reveal potentially productive strata
underlying a leasehold that lessees are impliedly obligated to pursue in order to
maximize royalties.
B.

Rules RegardingImplied Development Covenant

It is difficult to predict how the courts will resolve these types of
claims, particularly given the relatively modest body of case law on implied
covenants. The reality is that there are many roadblocks to a successful claim
based on the jurisprudence that has developed in states to the west of

See Jacobs v. CNG Transmission Corp., 332 F. Supp. 2d 759 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (explaining
that abandoned production equipment, lack of payment in lieu of development, and storage
payment was insufficient to maintain the lease).
103
Stevenson v. Barnes, 702 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Ark. 1986) (refusing to cancel the shallow
sands lease but cancelling the deeper sands lease based on lessee's admission that he would not
test or develop the deeper sands).
102
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Appalachia. 104 The case law in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia is
similar and therefore presents similar challenges to lessors claiming breach of
an implied development covenant.
As a threshold matter, courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia
recognize that the express terms of a contract control.105 Using ordinary rules of
contract interpretation, most cases may be decided based on the lease language
(and sometimes as a matter of law without the need for protracted discovery or
litigation). In addition, with the possible exception of Ohio (at least in the coal
context), 106 the courts recognize the usual rules regarding payments in lieu of
development that stay the implied covenant.' 0 7
If the lessor states a viable claim for breach of any implied covenant
that survives a motion to dismiss, courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West
Virginia will view it through the lens of the standard of performance adopted in
the jurisdiction. All three states recognize a standard of performance built into
the lease, whether it be the prudent operator standard as recognized in West
Virginia' 08 and Ohio' 09 or the good faith test recently invoked by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.1so The courts in the northeastern shale states
recognize that the lessor's interests in further development or further
exploration (and thus more opportunities for royalties) must be balanced

Kramer, supra note 26, at 367-68 ("The implied covenant of reasonable development is
rarely invoked because it requires a court to 'second-guess' an operator's decision to drill or not
drill additional wells. There is a built-in bias on behalf of operators not to drill additional wells
since they are bearing 100% of the cost and receiving something less than that in terms of
revenue.").
05
See Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 48 N.E. 502, 506 (Ohio 1897); Smith v. N.E. Natural Gas Co.,
No. 86 AP 030016, 1986 WL 11337, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept 30, 1986); Jacobs v. CNG
Transmission Corp., 772 A.2d 445, 455 (Pa. 2001) (explaining that express terms may render
implied covenant inoperative); Willison v. Consol. Coal Co., 637 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa. 1994)
("While recognizing that a variety of approaches have been followed in other jurisdictions, we
shall adhere to our established precedents requiring that the plain meaning of language used by
the parties be given effect."); St. Luke's United Methodist Church v. CNG Dev. Co., 663 S.E.2d
639, 643 (W. Va. 2008).
106
lonno v. Glen-Gery Corp., 443 N.E.2d 504, 505-07 (Ohio 1983) (finding that minimum
royalties for clay/coal mining did not preclude a claim of forfeiting a lease for breach of a
development covenant).
107 See Jacobs, 772 A.2d at 455; lafolla v. Douglas
Pocahontas Coal Corp., 250 S.E.2d 128,
132 (W. Va. 1978).
108 Jennings v. S. Carbon Co., 80 S.E. 368, 369-70 (W. Va. 1913); see also St. Luke's United
Methodist Church, 663 S.E.2d at 645-46.
104

109

Harris,48 N.E. at 505.

T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 276-78 (Pa. 2012); Colgan v. Forest
Oil Co., 45 A. 119, 121 (Pa. 1899); Young v. Forest Oil Co., 45 A. 121, 123 (Pa. 1899).
10
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against the lessee's interest in pursuing profitable development of the leased
premises."'
Although all three states recognize an implied covenant of reasonable
development,"l2 none of them have recognized a separate, further exploration
covenant as proposed by Professor Meyers. As of the date of this writing, with
the exception of one federal court in Pennsylvania," 3 courts in these
northeastern shale play states have yet to address directly any claims that
lessees have breached any potential implied covenant to explore deeper shale
formations.
C.

Remedy

The ultimate issue for the courts in the northeastern shale states may be
fashioning an appropriate remedy if a lessor ever establishes a breach of an
implied covenant to develop or further explore. In some cases, lessors may
demand damages. In other cases, lessors may demand cancellation of the lease
or at least partial cancellation of the deep strata with the hopes (but not the
guarantee) of re-leasing with another operator for a higher signing bonus or
better royalties.
Courts in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia generally
acknowledge that the usual remedy for breach of covenants is damages' 1 4
absent exceptional circumstances."l5 This may be a particularly important issue

III See supra notes 35, 38; Grass v. Big Creek Dev. Co., 84 S.E. 750, 753 (W. Va. 1915)
(discussing profitability for both lessor and lessee).
112 See, e.g., Harris, 48 N.E. at 502; Jacobs, 772 A.2d at 445;
Appeal of Baird, 6 A.2d 306
(Pa. 1939); Highfield Co. v. Kirk, 93 A. 815, 817 (Pa. 1915); Kleppner v. Lemon, 35 A. 109, 109
(Pa. 1896); McKnight v. Mfrs. Natural Gas Co., 23 A. 164 (Pa. 1892); St. Luke's United
Methodist Church, 663 S.E.2d at 643 n.3; Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 168 S.E. 366,
367-69 (W. Va. 1933).
113
See Delmas Ray Burkett, II Revocable Trust v. EXCO Res. (PA), LLC,
No. 2:11-cv-1394,
2012 WL 1019025 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2012). In Burkett, the court seemed to express doubt
about the viability of a claim to cancel a lease as to strata below the currently producing horizon
but denied a motion to dismiss the claim, noting that the plaintiff satisfied pleading standards.
114
See Moore v. Adams, No. 2007AP090066, 2008 WL 4907590, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
17, 2008) ("Ohio courts have recognized that forfeiture is an appropriate remedy when legal
damages resulting from a contractual breach are inadequate; upon a breach of implied covenants;
upon a claim of abandonment; or when necessary to do justice."); Girolami v. Peoples Natural
Gas Co., 76 A.2d 375, 377 (Pa. 1950) (noting that damages, rather than forfeiture, are the
adequate remedy for breach of covenant to pay royalties); St. Luke's United Methodist Church,
663 S.E.2d at 643 n.3.
115 See Beer v. Griffith, 399 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (Ohio 1980) (explaining
that a partial
cancellation is appropriate where evidence demonstrated that lessee was financially incapable of
operating the leased premises such that the court presumed it could not satisfy a damage award);
St. Luke's United Methodist Church, 663 S.E.2d at 647 (finding that an equitable remedy of
partial cancellation is only appropriate if damages are wholly inadequate).
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given that many lessees in Appalachia have maintained their leases by
production from shallow formations or by a well targeting the Marcellus or
Utica and have been perfectly compliant with their lease obligations, but
nonetheless may face allegations from lessors that they have not done enough.
Should the courts simply cancel the lease? The answer should be no.
Courts should be hesitant to hastily cancel leases in whole or in part at the
request of lessors and should reserve that remedy only for the most egregious
of circumstances given the complexity and expense of exploration and
development of shale gas and the volatility of gas prices, all of which (among
other things) drive a company's business decisions on where to drill wells, to
what depths, and when.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the opportunities presented by shale gas development,
litigation over the implied development covenant is inevitable. Some lessors in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia may raise claims that their lessees have
breached implied covenants in their lease in an attempt to reap more benefits or
cancel all or portions of the lease with the hope (but not the guarantee) of releasing to others on better terms.
Notwithstanding the shale gas phenomenon, the implied covenant of
development remains limited by a number of factors, including the express
language of the lease, payments in lieu of development, and requirements to
prove the lessee's ability to profit from any additional development demanded
by the lessor. Other significant factors include the extent and high expense of
new technology, the location of shale gas formations with production zones
suitable for commercial recovery, and the high burden of proving that a lessee
must place considerable funds at risk to satisfy any implied covenant in a lease.
With respect to remedies, it may be one thing to claim that production
companies should pursue their development activities with more diligence, but
a breach of an implied covenant of development should not be used to justify a
forfeiture of protected property interests in a lease.
Given that shale gas development is relatively new in the northeast, the
courts may be sorting through these thorny issues and resolving disputes over
the implied development covenant for many years to come.
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